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Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Trade
Anupam Chander*

a. introduction
When Lily Leong stepped outside that morning on July 1, 2025, the voice in her ear
guided her to the nearest Lime ebike, only two blocks away. Her work was ﬁfteen
kilometers away in Jakarta’s business district and her Samsung Universe One had
woken her that morning, timing its gentle intrusion based on her sleep cycle. Her
phone had reported that it was a good day to bike to work and had run through the
day’s appointments. As she walked, her Bose headset would gently interrupt her latest
K-Pop favorite, Girls Next Generation, to tell her which way to turn (‘Right after the
Starbucks’). She was hoping to be able to save enough money by the end of the year to
buy the Bose AR Glasses that would show her route without interrupting GNG’s ‘In a
Funk’. On her ebike, the voice guided her around the construction site building a new
skyscraper. She saw the Komatsu robot erecting the steel girders that framed the
building. The construction site was marked as a Human Exclusion Zone, an ‘HEZ,’
with prominent signs depicting a diagonal line crossing out a human being. Humans
supervised from a protected shelter across the street, staring at screens that connected
them to cameras and robots. She stopped the ebike to frame a photo with an idle
human in the foreground and the robot construction worker lifting a heavy steel beam
in the background and uploaded it to Instagram.
As she arrived at the skyscraper where she worked, the glass turnstile whisked open,
a screen displaying the photo from her ﬁrst day at work two years earlier when she had
long hair. In the elevator she put her hand to her mouth to mufﬂe her laugh at the
latest fad on TikTok – the #PetTwin challenge, where people showed their pets
wearing hairstyles and clothes matching themselves using images generated by an
app. Coming to her standing desk somewhere among the hundreds of desks on the
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fortieth ﬂoor, she sent a text to Xiaoice in Chinese about some issue she was having
with her loud neighbor at work, and the Microsoft AI responded with suggestions on
how to politely indicate her concern. Her Lenovo computer identiﬁed her through an
iris scan, and a program automatically queued up her ﬁrst task for the day – an
appeal of the bank’s automated denial of a housing loan in Germany.
Invisible strings pulled by invisible computers across the world shaped Leong’s
morning. Her Samsung phone relied on computers in Seoul to awaken her with
useful information about the day. The voice telling her which turn to make for a safer
biking route was Google’s Singapore computer. A Bose computer in Massachusetts
played songs that it thought she would like. The Komatsu heavy machinery installing
the steel girders and pouring the concrete was guided by Nvidia AI based out of Santa
Clara, California, coordinating with Komatsu computers in Tokyo. Instagram’s
California computers promoted her photo to followers, after scanning it for illegality.
The facial recognition system was the work of Hikvision operating through computers
in Shenzhen, China. The TikTok videos on her phone were selected for her by the
Shanghai-based enterprise using leased Amazon servers in the United States.
Microsoft ran its Xiaoice chatbot out of Beijing. The AI making the initial credit
decision lived on Ping An Technologies’ servers in Shenzhen. Even less visible were
the various smart city sensors and actuators operated by various unnamed companies
in China, the United States, and Singapore – these systems operated the trafﬁc signals,
routed the garbage trucks, and deployed city resources.
Even if this scenario imagines the near future, the technologies mentioned largely
exist today. Artiﬁcial intelligence (AI) is already crossing borders, learning, making
decisions, and operating cyber-physical systems.1 It underlies many of the services
that are offered today – from customer service chatbots to customer relations
software to business processes. AI is already powering trade today.
This chapter considers AI regulation from the perspective of international trade
law. Because of the near-universal reach of trade rules, the focus here will be on the
World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. My argument unfolds as follows.
Section B argues that foreign AI should be regulated by governments – indeed that
1

The WTO describes AI as follows: ‘One way to look at AI is as the latest form of automation.
However, instead of substituting machine power for manual labour, as in the past, the use of AI
involves substituting the computing ability of machines for human intelligence and expertise.
Human abilities that were once thought to be out of the reach of machines, such as making a
medical diagnosis, playing chess or navigating an automobile, are now either routine or well
within reach. Two uses of AI – analogous to the weak AI and strong AI distinction – may be
distinguished here, i.e. AI which aids the production of goods and services, and AI which helps
to generate new ideas. Examples of the former use of AI include guiding robots in warehouses,
optimizing packing and delivery, and detecting whether loan applicants are being truthful.
Examples of the latter use of AI are analysing data, solving mathematical problems, sequencing
the human genome, and exploring chemical reactions and materials.’
See WTO, World Trade Report 2018: The Future of World Trade: How Digital Technologies
are Transforming Global Commerce (Geneva: WTO, 2018), at 30 (references omitted).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 73.173.80.140, on 15 Jul 2021 at 19:32:19, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108919234.008

Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Trade

117

AI must be what I will call ‘locally responsible’. Section C then refutes arguments
that trade law should not apply to AI at all and shows how the WTO agreements
might apply to AI, using two hypothetical cases – a medical diagnostic AI-based
system and an insurance coverage decision-making AI. The analysis will reveal how
the WTO agreements leave room for governments to insist on locally responsible AI,
while at the same time promoting international trade powered by AI.

b ai’s kangaroo problem, or why regulate ai?
In 2018, President Emmanuel Macron announced that France will send regulators
to sit inside Facebook to evaluate how the company combats hate speech on its
services.2 The regulators will meet with Facebook decision-makers not only in its
ofﬁces in France, but in Facebook’s ofﬁces in Dublin, Ireland, and Menlo Park,
California.3 President Macron called this ‘smart regulation’ and hoped to extend the
model to the rest of ‘GAFA’ members – Google, Apple, and Amazon.4
But what about decisions made by AI? Indeed, while it has hired legions of
human content moderators, Facebook is also depending on AI to make content
moderation decisions. When Mark Zuckerberg testiﬁed before Congress in 2017, he
cited ‘artiﬁcial intelligence’ more than thirty times in his deposition.5 ‘Over the long
term,’ Zuckerberg offered, ‘building AI tools is going to be the scalable way to
identify and root out most of this harmful content.’6 So, just as it may be appropriate
for France to demand that Facebook’s human decision-makers in Ireland or
California comply with its laws – at least with respect to information destined for
France – it is appropriate for France to demand that Facebook’s AI decision-makers
follow its laws on hate speech.
Governments have good reasons to regulate trade powered by AI. Imagine a
dystopian turn to the sci-ﬁ scenario in the introduction: your phone is listening in
without permission and pushing advertising based on what it hears, your music app
is selling your movements, the robot builder builds an insecure structure, the social
network’s algorithms promote hate speech because they engender more engagement, the chatbot starts giving dangerous medical advice, the credit decisions are
racially discriminatory, or the smart city is a massive surveillance system in the
service of a repressive government.
2

3
4
5

6

M. Rosemain, M. Rose, and G. Barzic, ‘France to ‘Embed’ Regulators at Facebook to Combat
Hate Speech,’ Reuters, 12 November 2018, available at www.reuters.com/article/us-france-facebookmacron/france-to-embed-regulators-at-facebook-to-combat-hate-speech-idUSKCN1NH1UK.
Ibid.
Ibid.
D. Harwell, ‘AI Will Solve Facebook’s Most Vexing Problems, Mark Zuckerberg Says. Just
Don’t Ask When or How,’ The Washington Post, 11 April 2018 (noting Zuckerberg’s promotion
of artiﬁcial intelligence in connection with decisions related to removing speech for fake news,
hate speech, discriminatory ads, and terrorist propaganda).
Ibid.
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With respect to the broad array of services now increasingly powered by AI, there
are many legitimate (by which I mean non-protectionist) reasons why a government
might seek to regulate the underlying AI. AI operates quite differently from human
beings, raising both new issues and also old issues in a new way. AI operates at a
different scale, using a different evaluation process, without emotion and judgment.
Some may see being subject to decisions taken by AI as an attack on their dignity,
while others may worry about who will be held accountable for AI decisions.7
Regulations built for a world of human reasoning, emotion, and judgment may
not equal a world where decisions are made by AI.
How is automated decision-making different? First, and obviously, it is done by
computers rather than humans, and thus lacks traditional qualities of human judgment, empathy, and emotion, though it might offer facsimiles of any of these qualities.
Second, the ability to transmit real-time data has enabled far more personalized crossborder decision-making than ever before – whether by humans or AI. Third, because
it is computerized, it may be done at enormous scale. Fourth, while AI might not be
programmed with invidious bias, it might learn that bias from the real-world data it
receives – without even knowing perhaps to be mindful of the possibility of such bias.8
Decision-making from abroad, of course, predates the rise of AI. Banks, credit
card companies, insurance companies, and the like have long relied on decisions
made abroad. While there is nothing per se novel about decision-making or information processing across borders, the fact that the Internet now touches almost all of
our daily activities increases the opportunities for AI-based decision-making, including decision-making across borders. AI changes the nature, scope, and scale of
foreign decision-making. We are entering into a world in which your credit, your
job prospects, your insurance claim, the news you read, and even the dates you go
on are determined by faceless computers in a distant land.
There is a reason to believe that AI systems will make more mistakes as they cross
borders. First, AI might be designed for different environments, nurtured on data from
polities that might behave differently. This is a form of the well-known problem that
AI trained on, say, a largely white (and male) population, might perform poorly with
respect to other populations. Imagine, for example, an AI trained to recognize threats
in the United States, but which fails to understand the context of threats in
Myanmar – to possibly tragic consequences. Second, because of immense commercial pressures to claim the ﬁrst mover advantage – attracting both media and venture
capital, AI is being rolled out before it is ready. Because machine learning systems
beneﬁt from larger datasets, the opportunity to engage more people across the globe
will tempt companies to apply their systems ever more broadly. Third, the quality of
7

8

M. E. Kaminski, ‘Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic
Accountability,’ Southern California Law Review 92 (2019), 1529–1616 (identifying concerns
animating calls for regulating algorithmic decision-making).
Liu v. Uber Technologies Inc., 20-cv-07499, District Court, N.D. California; A. Chander, ‘The
Racist Algorithm?’, Michigan Law Review 115 (2017), 1023–1045.
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AI’s judgments will be hard to assess because ﬁrms have incentives to proclaim the
effectiveness of their AI while individual users cannot amass the overall data necessary
to evaluate it. Like the problem of legal transplants – which can prove unsuited in new
social, cultural and legal contexts – AI transplants might prove problematic.9
Thus, there may be special reasons to distrust foreign AI, which may not have
been trained on local conditions. I call this ‘AI’s Kangaroo Problem’ in reference to
the Volvo case, where Volvo realized that its ‘Large Animal Detection’ system
initially failed to recognize kangaroos because of their jumping, and then began
training its system with ﬁlms of ‘kangaroos’ roadside behaviour.’10 When a Tesla,
apparently on autopilot, slammed into a stopped tow truck on a Russian road, one
news account offered a conjecture: ‘Tesla cars [may not be] trained on Russian roads
and vehicles.’11 More generally, AI will often need to be culturally or environmentally sensitive and an AI ‘trained’ on the behavior of the US population may well
produce erroneous results when applied in China, or vice versa.
AI’s Kangaroo Problem makes it especially urgent for governments to monitor
foreign AI. Of course, higher transparency and accountability obligations on foreign
ﬁrms than those imposed on domestic ﬁrms will invite scrutiny as a discriminatory
measure – and so governments should be careful that any special scrutiny is properly
justiﬁed. One question in this regard will be about a speciﬁc set of rules that are only
triggered by size. If local companies are all likely to remain smaller than the
threshold, there is the possibility of exploiting size triggers to disfavor foreign
competitors. Furthermore, focusing only on the world’s biggest Internet companies
may or may not be justiﬁed because of their impact – but it is also important to
remember that some of the most pernicious applications of AI might escape scrutiny
if we limit our regulatory attention to a handful of enterprises.
Overall, today, decisions about people and machines are being made by
machines. AI helps people ﬁle tax returns, it helps offer or deny loans, it matches
individuals for dating, it makes investment decisions, sorts through job applications,
and delivers search results. Given that AI is making decisions that affect people’s
lives, governments should insist on what we might call ‘locally responsible AI.’

c ai and trade law
Does trade law apply at all to AI? A skeptic might offer two arguments – the ﬁrst
textual and the second conceptual. First, the WTO agreements and the scheduled
9

10

11

On the inadequacy of legal transplants, see, e.g., P. Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of ‘Legal
Transplants’,’ Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 4 (1997), 111–124; M.
Siems, ‘Malicious Legal Transplants,’ Legal Studies 38 (2018), 103–119.
BBC, ‘Volvo’s Driverless Cars ‘Confused’ by Kangaroos,’ BBC News, 27 June 2017, available at
www.bbc.com/news/technology-40416606.
B. Templeton, ‘Another Alleged Tesla Autopilot Failure Raises Questions on Tesla Training
System,’ Forbes, 12 August 2019.
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commitments of the WTO members that form an integral part of the treaties
nowhere mention AI, and thus should not be interpreted to cover this new technology.12 Applying trade law to this new sphere would violate the sound expectations of
the parties. Second, AI is simply a method of doing something, the skeptic might
assert, and the trade agreements focus on what is actually provided rather than the
process used to provide it – a version of the process/product distinction elaborated
for goods.13 After all, if trade law does not scrutinize whether a particular decision
made by a company is made by an individual or a committee, then why should it pay
attention to the decision-making process at all?
Can the WTO agreements apply to AI decision-making? Even if AI techniques
were not widely used when the WTO agreements were negotiated, the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)14 does not limit itself to the technologies in
use in 1994. GATS proves relevant through three characteristics: First and most
importantly, GATS focuses on measures regulating services without regard to the
technologies by which those services are provided.15 Its ﬁrst substantive sentence
declares, ‘[t]his Agreement applies to measures by Members affecting trade in
services.’16 Second, the GATS applies to technologies that may have not been on
the minds of the negotiators.17 When China sought to deny that it had included
electronic distribution of audiovisual material in its WTO commitments in the
China – Audiovisual Products case, the WTO Appellate Body ruled decisively that
it was indeed covered.18 As I have noted elsewhere, ‘By subsuming an electronic
version of the service within a services commitment and by interpreting treaty

12

13

14

15

16
17

18

R. Zhang, ‘Covered or Not Covered: That Is the Question,’ WTO Working Paper No 11 (2015),
at 14–17. ‘A more far-reaching interpretation was that any service ‘unforeseen’ at the time of
commitments could not be considered as covered by it, even if the deﬁnition in the CPC
covered the ‘unforeseen’ service.’ Ibid.
See G. Cook, ‘Humpty Dumpty and the Illusion of ‘Evolutionary Interpretation’ in WTO Dispute
Settlement,’ in G. Abi-Saab et al. (eds), Evolutionary Interpretation and International Law (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2019). See also Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading
Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products
(China – Audiovisual Products), WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 21 December 2009. In China –
Audiovisual Products (at para. 396), the Appellate Body found that the terms in China’s
Schedule ‘are sufﬁciently generic that what they apply to may change over time.’
General Agreement on Trade in Services, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183; 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994), entered
into force 1 January 1995 [hereinafter: GATS].
WTO, Work Programme on Electronic Commerce – Progress Report to the General Council,
S/L/74, 27 July 1999, at 4; see also WTO Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (US – Gambling), WT/DS285/R,
adopted 10 November 2004 and WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (US – Gambling), WT/
DS285/AB/R, adopted 7 April 2005.
Article I:1 GATS.
See generally S.-Y. Peng, ‘Renegotiate the WTO ‘Schedules of Commitments’?: Technological
Development and Treaty Interpretation,’ Cornell International Law Journal 45 (2012), 403–430.
China – Audiovisual Products, note 12, at para. 412.
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commitments in a dynamic form, the treaty can take account of changing technologies.’19 If a term is listed in a sufﬁciently generic fashion, it should be interpreted to
cover activities that were not commercialized at the time of the listing.20 Indeed,
when it determined that electronic distribution of audiovisual recordings was
covered by China’s commitments, the Appellate Body observed that it was not
necessary that such electronic distribution was feasible at the time when China
acceded to the WTO.21 Thus, a generic commitment for market access for insurance decision-making under mode 1 (cross-border supply) should be read to cover
AI-based decision-making as well. Third, as China – Audiovisual Products decision
makes clear, the GATS applies to electronically mediated services – a fact essential
to enable it to cover AI-powered services. Fourth, the GATS schedules explicitly
include a variety of computer and related services in their ambit, with at least
seventy-seven countries committing to liberalize trade in ‘data processing services.’22
The end result is that when a government measure affects the ability of a foreign
company to supply AI-based services into that country, GATS is applicable.
The second objection challenges the idea that AI can be reached by trade law on
the ground that how a decision is made with respect to any service is not a proper
subject of trade law. This is a version of the controversial process and production
methods (PPMs) distinction from the realm of goods,23 where an importing government may not be able to inquire into the process by which a product is produced,
only evaluating its quality as it arrives at the border.24 Steve Charnovitz divides PPMs
into three types: (i) the how-produced standard; (ii) the government policy standard; and
(iii) the producer characteristics standard.25 Translating this into the domain of services, it

19

20
21
22

23

24

25

A. Chander, The Electronic Silk Road: How the Web Binds the World Together in Commerce
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), at 156.
China – Audiovisual Products, note 12, at para. 396; Cook, note 12.
China – Audiovisual Products, note 12, at para. 396.
R. Berry and M. Reisman, ‘Policy Challenges of Cross-Border Cloud Computing,’ Journal of
International Commerce and Economics 4 (2012), 1–38, at 22 (noting that sixty countries have
commitments on ‘on-line information and/or data processing,’ while seventy-six have commitments for data processing). My review with Usman Ahmed ﬁnds at least seventy-seven countries
with ‘CPC 843’ commitments for data processing services, though some of these commitments
may be narrower than all data processing services. See U. Ahmed and A. Chander,
‘Information Goes Global: Protecting Privacy, Security, and the New Economy in a World
of Cross-Border Data Flows,’ E15 Expert Group on the Digital Economy Think Piece (2015). For
all commitments and exceptions of the WTO members for computer and related services, see
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/computer_e/computer_e.htm.
The term ‘processes and production methods’ originated in the GATT agreement of 1979 on
Technical Barriers to Trade and referred to product standards focused on the production
method rather than product characteristics. For example, a law prohibiting the landing of ﬁsh
caught using a driftnet entails a PPM. By contrast, a law prohibiting the sale of ﬁsh smaller than
a prescribed size does not constitute a PPM.
S. Charnovitz, ‘The Law of Environmental ‘PPMs’ in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of
Illegality,’ Yale Journal of International Law 27 (2002), 59–110, at 64–65.
Ibid., at 67.
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would mean that the importing government treats the foreign service provider differently
because of (i) how it produced the service; (ii) the law governing that service in the
exporting country; or (iii) the characteristics of the foreign service provider, respectively.
With respect to services, however, regulation often focuses on both, the provider
and the process used, as it may be difﬁcult to regulate the service directly. Licensing
requirements, for example, often seek to assure that the individual performing the
task has the relevant education, ethics, and experience to perform the service. In
general, how a service is produced may be important to evaluate its quality – such as
knowing whether an accountant or an engineer or a cybersecurity expert has
followed the standard protocols.26 Of course, much of the process used to provide
the service could be inscribed in the service itself but it is often difﬁcult to see the
mark of that process directly. Thus, we often use other measures to evaluate the
service – such as the prominence of the ﬁrm or the education of its employees or
their use of a widely accepted method.27 This is no less true with AI. Demands for
explainability, for example, which have become common nowadays,28 are often
ultimately about a form of due process, including the ability to challenge a decision
that one feels is unjust.
The following two sections explore two speciﬁc scenarios of the interaction
between AI and international trade rules.

I Scenario One: Dr. AI
Imagine if a country bars unlicensed medical diagnosis, and interprets this
requirement to bar all AI-based medical diagnosis, as there is no process for licensing an AI. What if a foreign company wishes to offer AI-based medical diagnosis
into that country? Could it rely on the GATS commitments to liberalize trade in
data-processing services to argue that the ban on AI medical diagnosis violated that
country’s WTO obligations?29
26

27

28

29

Chander, note 18, at 146 (‘The measure of the quality of a service often involves not just the
appraisal of the outcome but also the appraisal of the process by which the service was
produced’); see also K. Nicolaidis and S. K. Schmidt, ‘Mutual Recognition ‘on Trial’: The
Long Road to Services Liberalization,’ Journal of European Public Policy 14 (2007), 717–734, at
719 (‘for services almost all regulations have to do with processes’).
The WTO secretariat’s Trade in Services division similarly observes: ‘Services are intangible
and their supply often requires an interaction between the service supplier and consumer. This
implies that consumers frequently cannot appreciate the quality of the service until they have
consumed it.’ See WTO Trade in Services Division, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation
Pursuant to GATS Article VI:4 – Background and Current State of Play, June 2011, available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/dom_reg_negs_bckgddoc_e.doc.
See, e.g., U. Gasser and V. A. F. Almeida, ‘A Layered Model for AI Governance,’ IEEE
Internet Computing 21 (2017), 58–62; A. Deeks, ‘The Judicial Demand for Explainable Artiﬁcial
Intelligence,’ Columbia Law Review 119 (2019), 1829–1850.
Of course, the aggrieved corporation could not seek to enforce GATS itself but could pressure
its home state to do so.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 73.173.80.140, on 15 Jul 2021 at 19:32:19, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108919234.008

Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Trade

123

The ﬁrst step in making such a claim is to establish that the country had in fact
committed to liberalize trade in such AI-based medical diagnosis services in the ﬁrst
instance. The market access and national treatment obligations, as we have said, rest
on a nation’s GATS schedule. This, in turn, raises difﬁcult questions of classiﬁcation. Suppose an AI performs the task of assessing whether a skin lesion is cancerous
and does so via a smartphone app. Many but not all WTO members used the United
Nations’ Central Product Classiﬁcation (CPC) in its provisional 1991 version30 to
schedule their liberalization commitments. The CPC has been revised numerous
times since but these updates have not been reﬂected in the law of the WTO.31
Under the CPC scheme, human health services are classiﬁed as ‘CPC 931,’ with
subdivisions for ‘general’ (93121) and ‘specialized’ (93122) health services, as well as
other subdivisions. But perhaps the AI could be seen as a ‘data processing service’
(CPC 843) or a ‘database service’ (CPC 844) at the same time – after all the AI is an
immense data processor and may rely on signiﬁcant database functions? The GATS
classiﬁcation is designed to be exclusionary – that is, any given service should fall
only under one category32 but it can be difﬁcult to place many technologically
powered services within the classiﬁcation framework existing at the time of the
WTO’s founding.
The CPC itself provides interpretative rules, including two rules relevant here:
1. The category that provides the most speciﬁc description shall be preferred to categories providing a more general description; and
2. Composite services consisting of a combination of different services
which cannot be classiﬁed by reference to (a) shall be classiﬁed as if
they consisted of the service which gives them their essential character,
in so far as this criterion is applicable.33

30

31

32

33

United Nations, Provisional Central Product Classiﬁcation (CPC), UN Statistical Papers,
Series M, No 77, Ver.1.1, E.91.XVII.7, 1991 [hereinafter: CPC]. The CPC is a classiﬁcation
based on the physical characteristics of goods or on the nature of the services rendered. Each
type of good or service distinguished in the CPC is deﬁned in such a way that it is normally
produced by only one activity as deﬁned in International Standard Industry Classiﬁcation of all
Economic Activities (ISIC). The CPC covers products that are an output of economic
activities, including transportable goods, non-transportable goods and services.
See R. H. Weber and M. Burri, Classiﬁcation of Services in the Digital Economy (Berlin:
Springer, 2012), at 19.
A. D. Mitchell and N. Mishra, ‘Data at the Docks: Modernizing International Trade Law for
the Digital Economy,’ Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology 20 (2018),
1073–1134, at 1090 (‘in a country’s schedule, commitments on a service sector or subsector
are exclusive; thus, a speciﬁc digital service (like the search engine services of Google) cannot
be simultaneously classiﬁed under computer and related services (more speciﬁcally, data
processing services), telecommunications services (online information and data processing
services), and advertising services’). See also US–Gambling, note 14.
CPC 1991, at 28.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 73.173.80.140, on 15 Jul 2021 at 19:32:19, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108919234.008

124

Anupam Chander

If we assume that ‘medical diagnostic service’ is more speciﬁc than ‘data processing
service,’ then an AI-based medical diagnostic service should properly be classiﬁed as
a ‘medical diagnostic service.’ Thus, a commitment under CPC 843 for a data
processing service is likely insufﬁcient to grant a foreign AI medical diagnostic
service provider market access and national treatment in that country without a
relevant CPC 931 human health service commitment.
In China–Electronic Payments, the panel, however, questioned this approach,
arguing that ‘the matter is not so obvious that we could conﬁdently determine,
without undertaking a detailed examination, [which service] is ‘more speciﬁc’ in
relation to the services at issue.’34 Yet, the panel’s preferred approach largely reached
the same conclusion. The panel recognized ‘electronic payment services for payment card transactions’ as an ‘integrated service’ that included other services that
could be provided independently.35 The relevant classiﬁcation in such cases would
be the one describing the integrated service.36
What if a country has left medical services unbound, but has bound data
processing services for both market access and national treatment? Would a foreign
AI medical diagnostic provider be able to beneﬁt from that data processing commitment? It seems likely that it would only be able to claim them for providing data
processing but not for the medical diagnostic service itself, which would have
required a CPC 931 commitment.
The scheduling guidelines adopted by the WTO’s Council for Trade in Services
in 2001 distinguish between a committed service and input services to that committed service.37 The scheduling of a committed service does not imply that the input
services are also equally committed when used for purposes other than the committed, composite service. It seems sensible, however, to assume that the input services
are automatically committed when provided as an input into the committed service – that is, it should not be possible for a WTO member to specify that a foreign
medical diagnostic provider (presuming that medical diagnostic services are committed) must use domestic AI. Otherwise, the commitment of the integrated service
would be less meaningful because one could establish a variety of requirements for
the inputs into that service that would greatly erode the commitment. Then if
members specify medical diagnosis, they need not specify all the input services
needed to supply a medical diagnosis. In our hypothetical case of ‘Dr. AI,’ if the data
processing or database service is an input service to the AI-based medical diagnostic
34
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WTO Panel Report, China – Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services (China–
Electronic Payment Services), WT/DS413/R, adopted August 31, 2012, at para. 7.71.
Ibid., at paras. 7.55–7.62, and 7.188.
Ibid.
WTO, Guidelines for the Scheduling of Speciﬁc Commitments under the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS), S/L/92, 23 March 2001, at 25 (‘It is understood that market access
and national treatment commitments apply only to the sectors or subsectors inscribed in the
schedule. They do not imply a right for the supplier of a committed service to supply
uncommitted services which are inputs to the committed service’).
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service, then a commitment under CPC 931 for such a service would include the
data processing or database service.

II Scenario Two: Claims Adjuster AI
Imagine a country that bans automated decision-making for insurance coverage
decisions. This would go beyond the right to object to a decision made by an
automated algorithm under the European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR).38 Such a scenario would be reminiscent of the genetic engineering debate in trade law – where Europe rejected genetically modiﬁed food
outright, while the United States insists on their safety.39
Imagine also that domestic insurance providers are not technologically minded,
while foreign competitors are more likely to use AI. So the burden of the rule largely
falls on foreign providers. Assume that the country banning AI has made market
access and national treatment commitments for the relevant insurance products
under the Annex on Financial Services, but has limited those to mode 3 (commercial presence), as countries often are reluctant to allow for cross-border trade in
ﬁnancial services because of prudential regulation of ﬁnancial institutions to ensure,
among other things, their safety and soundness.
Might the foreign country of that foreign insurance provider with a domestic
establishment have a claim? The foreign home might challenge the absolute bar as a
violation of that importing state’s market access commitments. A ban might be seen as a
zero quota, and thus a numerical limitation on the number of providers – which will be
a violation of the GATS market access obligation contained in Article XVI:2.40
The foreign country might also argue that the ban violates the national treatment
requirement by effectively preferring domestic insurance providers, which do not
use AI for decisions. A central question in answering this question is whether the AIbased insurance service was ‘like’ the non-AI based insurance service. While
guidance on the interpretation of ‘likeness’ when it comes to services is limited,41
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Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation, GDPR), OJ L [2016] 119/1 [hereinafter: General Data Protection Regulation or
GDPR], at Article 22(1): data subjects ‘have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely
on automated processing, including proﬁling, which produces legal effects concerning him or
her or similarly signiﬁcantly affects him or her.’
See WTO Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products (EC–Biotech), WT/DS921/R, adopted 21 November 2006; see
also M. A. Pollack and G. C. Shaffer, When Cooperation Fails: The International Law and
Politics of Genetically Modiﬁed Foods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
WTO Panel Report, US – Gambling, note 14, at para. 239.
The US argued that online gambling was unlike real world gambling because ‘in virtual
casinos, the result is generated by a software algorithm’ rather than physical movement. The
‘online casino is an illusion – a ‘virtual reality’ environment in which outcomes are controlled
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the Appellate Body has indicated that the ‘fundamental purpose’ of the likeness
comparison is ‘to assess whether and to what extent the services and service suppliers
at issue are in a competitive relationship.’42
If a tribunal concludes that the AI ban violates either market access or national
treatment commitments, the importing nation will argue that the ban is justiﬁed by
considerations of privacy, public order, or even public morals (with respect to the
latter, the argument would be that having such important decisions made as
insurance denial about someone by an AI would be an affront to human dignity).
Article XIV of the GATS permits a derogation that is ‘necessary to protect public
morals or to maintain public order’43 but the ‘public order exception may be
invoked only where a genuine and sufﬁciently serious threat is posed to one of the
fundamental interests of society.’44 One focal point of the analysis will be whether
the ban is necessary to protect public order. The exporting nation might argue that
an alternative WTO-consistent that achieves the same ends is reasonably available,
and thus an outright ban is not necessary.45 It might for instance point to the
German approach as such an alternative: Germany explicitly recognizes automated
decision-making for insurance decisions but requires the insurance company to offer
human review for any negative decisions.46
In summing up, even if existing trade law does have mechanisms to reduce
protectionist barriers to trade in AI, there remains substantial room for disagreement
over whether any particular rule that burdens trade in AI can be justiﬁed. The
examples above point to some of the debates and critical questions, such as: Is AI
medical diagnosis ‘like’ human medical diagnosis? Can an AI-based insurer be
banned on the grounds that it is likely to be biased or opaque? The rules as they
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by a computer rather than by the laws of the physical world,’ the US insisted (see WTO Panel
Report, US–Gambling, note 14). Because of the exercise of judicial economy, however, the
dispute settlement body did not reach the issue of national treatment, and thus, ‘there is up
until today no jurisprudence on how such characteristics on the method of supply should be
evaluated’ with respect to services. See N. Diebold, Non-discrimination in International Trade
in Services: ‘Likeness’ in WTO/GATS (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), at 252.
WTO Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services,
WT/DS453/R, adopted 9 May 2016, at paras. 6.33–6.34.
Article XIV(a) and Article XIV(b) GATS.
Article XIV GATS.
WTO Panel Report, US–Gambling, note 14, at paras. 306–307: ‘A comparison between the
challenged measure and possible alternatives should then be undertaken, and the results of
such comparison should be considered in the light of the importance of the interests at issue. It
is on the basis of this ‘weighing and balancing’ and comparison of measures, taking into
account the interests or values at stake, that a panel determines whether a measure is ‘necessary’
or, alternatively, whether another, WTO-consistent measure is ‘reasonably available.’’ The
exporting country can also argue that the challenged measure is arbitrary or is an unjustiﬁable
discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
trade in services, as speciﬁed in the chapeau of Article XIV GATS.
G. Malgieri, ‘Automated Decision-Making in the EU Member States: The Right to Explanation
and Other ‘Suitable Safeguards’ in the National Legislation,’ Computer Law and Security Review
35 (2019), 1–26, at 7–8.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 73.173.80.140, on 15 Jul 2021 at 19:32:19, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108919234.008

Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Trade

127

stand do not give clear answers to such questions. Internationally agreed frameworks
for responsible AI might offer a process to protect national regulatory goals while
enabling trade in AI.

d conclusion
Governments across the world are struggling to keep up with technology. The rise of
AI decision-making, in everything from cars to media to business processes, challenges regulatory capacity. Governments must regulate AI in order to further
traditional regulatory goals, such as consumer protection, privacy, and law enforcement. Governments can, however, craft or enforce AI rules that disfavor foreign
enterprises. The regulation of AI should not be used to create yet another behindthe-border trade barrier.
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